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We analyze practices of political activists in a Palestinian 
village located in the West Bank, who organize weekly 
demonstrations against Israel’s settlement policy and the 
separation wall. Over a period of 28 months, we 
conducted a field study consisting of eight days ‘on the 
ground’ observation and interviewing, and extensive 
monitoring of Internet communication. We describe the 
activists’ background and their efforts to organize these 
demonstrations under conditions of military occupation. 
Over time, we observe the role both digital and material 
factors play in the organization of protest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Social media like Twitter and Facebook were said to have 
had a significant impact on the 2010/2011 uprisings in 
Tunisia, after a street vendor’s self-immolation in Sidi 
Bouzid (Wulf et al. 2013). These protests marked the 
starting point for the so-called “Arab Spring” that led to 
the overturn of the political regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Yemen. While many authors stress the crucial 
role of social media for these “Arab Spring” uprisings 
(e.g. Ghonim 2012), the actual contribution of the Web 
2.0 to the developments in the different mid-east countries 
is debatable (e.g. Anderson 2011).  
There is little doubt that new media have been extensively 
used for political mobilization in the Arab world, but we 
still do not have a convincing picture of how they are 
used in detail, what specific variations we might see in 
local use or their effects. Existing research has 
demonstrated very convincingly the extent to which 
(micro-) blogging applications were used during the 
“Arab Spring” (Starbird and Palen 2012; Kavanaugh et al. 
2012, Al-Ani et al. 2012). Based, as they were, on 
sophisticated log file and content analysis of data 
downloaded from these media channels, these studies 
could not, for good reasons, provide an understanding of 
the detailed social, political and material context in which 
these applications were used. That means, and this is 
entirely understandable, they were able to provide only a 
very limited picture of what happened ‘on the ground’ 
and how political activists appropriated these media into 
their daily practices. We argue below that orthodox 
qualitative studies play a useful role in supplementing ‘e-
research’ into political activism (Wulf et al. 2013).  
In the following, we look at a political conflict which has 
had an impact and continues to have an impact on the 
Middle East geo-political environment: the tense political 
relations between Israel and the Palestinians. Our account 
entails a detailed examination of the work of political 
activists in a Palestinian village, and, more specifically, 
how internet and social media applications were 
appropriated in this struggle. It is necessarily partial 
insofar as it would be impractical to engage in empirical 
work on both sides of this divide. 
The paper is structured as follows: after a discussion of 
current research, we describe the political and 
infrastructural framing conditions in the West Bank in 
order to motivate the research methods we use. Then, we 
present the political activists and their weekly 
demonstrations against the land-taking and the separation 
wall. Over the past three years we observed the activists 
when appropriating new media for their political struggle. 
After presenting these data we discuss our findings. 
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 CURRENT WORK  
In recent years we have seen an increasing density of ICT 
usage in support of political activism and a developing 
interest in the CSCW and CHI communities in these 
topics (e.g., Al-Ani et al. 2012; Kavanaugh et al. 2012; 
Wulf et al. 2013; for an overview see Saeed et al. 2011). 
Saeed et al. (2011) investigated the role digital media 
played in organizing the European Social Forum and 
pointed out the importance of simple tools already widely 
used by individual activists, such as email distribution 
lists and WWW-sites.  
Subsequently, a series of studies on social media use 
during the so-called “Arab Spring” were published (Lotan 
et al. 2011; Starbird and Palen 2012; Al-Ani et al. 2012; 
Kavanaugh et al. 2012). These studies describe aspects of 
the use of blogging and micro-blogging sites, such as 
Twitter, mainly during the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. 
While hugely valuable, these studies mainly use ‘logging’ 
methodologies and as such tell us less about how the use 
of social media interacts with users’ political activities in 
practice. In addressing these lacunae, Wulf et al. (2013) 
investigated how social media use supported political 
activists ‘on the ground’ in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.   
Al-Ani et al. (2012) investigated the Egyptian 
blogosphere during the “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, 
based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of blog 
postings. They identified so-called “counter-narratives” 
created by Egyptian bloggers to protest against the 
Government’s official communication and described the 
blogosphere as an “alternative public space” (p. 25). In 
another study on blog postings, Mark et al. (2012) 
focused on “war diaries”, published by Iraqi bloggers 
during the war in Iraq. Based on topic modeling and a 
quantitative analysis of postings, the authors investigated 
the relationship between war postings and other topics, 
esp. postings on people’s everyday life and their daily 
routines. Semaan and Mark (2011) examined trust 
building in disrupted environments, based on (mainly 
telephone) interviews with Iraqi civilians during the 
second Gulf war, focusing on (public) identity. In another 
study Mark and Semaan (2009) focused on collaboration 
structures and patterns of action during wartime, based on 
semi-structured telephone interviews with civilians from 
Iraq and Israel.  
Nevertheless, to our knowledge there are very few papers 
which directly investigate how internet and social media 
are actually appropriated by political activists under 
dangerous conditions (such as armed conflicts, political 
instability, occupation, or military rule). As indicated, the 
above mentioned research mainly focuses on the use of 
new media in disrupted environments and is (quite 
understandably) mainly based on analysis of digital data 
or semi-structured (telephone) interviews. To supplement 
such work, we base our study on first-hand observations 
and in-depth interviews in situ. In the following we 
present results of an investigation ‘on the ground’ of how 
social media is used by Palestinian activists protesting 
against Israeli settlement policies, and against the 
separation wall.  
WEST BANK: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND INTERNET 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The West Bank is a part of the Palestinian territory which 
the State of Israel occupied during the Six-day War in 
1967. Since then it has remained under Israeli military 
control. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, parts of the 
West Bank are now under the administration of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). 
Since 1967, Israeli settlements have been established in 
the West Bank. More than 500.000 settlers are living in 
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (among 2.4 
million Palestinians). The international community 
considers these settlements to be illegal (UN Security 
Council Resolution 446). Starting from 2003 during the 
Second Intifada, the Israeli government started building a 
separation wall around and within the West Bank, which 
it considered to be necessary as an act of self-defense 
against terrorist attacks. The wall is mainly built on 
Palestinian land, disconnects the Palestinian population 
and, from their point of view, contributes to the 
expropriation of their land (Barak-Erez 2006).  
As a reaction to the building of the wall, Palestinian 
villages started regular demonstrations. One of these 
villages is Al Ma’sara, located on the southern hills of 
Bethlehem. It has less than 1000 inhabitants and is part of 
a chain of villages where some 14000 inhabitants live. So 
far, these villages - it is claimed - have lost some 3.500 
dunum (some 865 acres) in land to Israeli settlements.  
Within this chain of villages, Al Ma’sara is a major 
location of such demonstrations. Since 2006 it has held 
weekly demonstrations aimed at defending land rights and 
opposing the Israeli occupation. In addition, legal means 
have been used in defense of these rights, culminating in a 
recent (limited) victory in the highest Israeli court.  
Divided into two areas cut off from each other, 
telecommunication became the main communication 
means for the Palestinian people living in the West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip. Like in other countries in the 
Middle East, the percentage of internet users has grown 
strongly during the last decade (58.9 % of the population 
in Palestine at the end of 2011 according to 
Internetworldstats (2012)). In the West Bank, there is a 
large gap in usage between the urban and rural areas. 
With the increasing use of digital media, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict obviously is not just a political, partly 
armed, conflict anymore; it is becoming a media war (see 
e.g. Aouragh, 2011). 
Since the beginning in the late 1990s where Palestinian 
people started to „tell the world their story“, some of their 
work led to a sophisticated „all new-media activism“ 
(Khoury-Machool, 2007, p. 25). Websites like Google, 
YouTube, Twitter or Facebook became very popular 
latterly. In March 2012 Facebook counted more than 
900.000 Palestinian users in the West Bank 
(Internetworldstats, 2012). But Palestinian activists and 
their supporters are faced with a new generation of 
censorship in this field: a Facebook page called „Third 
Palestinian Intifada“ was removed upon request from the 
Israeli government, and due to a similar request Apple 
removed the App „Third Palestinian Intifada“ from its 
App Store.   
Like most of the infrastructure and resources in the West 
Bank, air wave bandwidths are controlled and allocated 
by the Israeli authorities. This includes the frequency 
control for TV and Radio stations and mobile operators. 
Furthermore, access to the global network has to go 
through Israeli companies. The two Palestinian mobile 
telephone providers are still not allowed to operate 3G 
services. Even the installation of point-to-point radio 
systems needs Israeli approval which is not easy to obtain. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
“And  it  is  in  understanding what … doing ethnography  is,  that  a  start 
can be made  toward grasping what anthropological  analysis  amounts 
to as a  form of knowledge. This,  it must  immediately be  said,  is not a 
matter of methods.” (C. Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures) 
Ethnography is a contested site. It has been used for a 
wide variety of theoretical, analytic or descriptive 
purposes and presupposes no particular data collection 
techniques, no rules concerning time taken and no 
uncontested position concerning truth and objectivity. It 
can and sometimes does have a relationship to political or 
moral positioning (see e.g. Marcus 1998), such that 
ethnographers can be seen as ‘circumstantial activists’. 
Three basic principles govern our approach to the 
ethnographic here: 
Firstly, that ethnography is characterized by analytic 
commitments rather than rules of method. As Geertz has 
put it (in interview), it [has neither] "a distinct subject 
matter" or a "real method" of research’. Method, in short, 
follows purpose.  To be clear, our purposes here are not 
theoretical. They entail an initial analysis of the specific 
ways in which the digital, the ideological and the material 
intertwine. 
Secondly, that ethnography is inevitably partial, 
incomplete and purposeful. In this respect, we follow 
authorities such as Geertz 1977; Marcus (ibid) as well as 
CHI practitioners who have adopted a similar stance (see 
e.g. Dourish 2006) 
Thirdly, that we share a minimal commitment to seeing 
things from the point of view of the actor (although this 
admittedly can mean a number of different things). For 
anthropologists, this has typically meant attempts to 
uncover cultural ‘rules’ (see e.g Winch 1958; Geertz 
1977) and situating the particular in the more general. 
Coming as a stranger has, given that commitment, 
necessarily meant a period of immersion. It is important 
to recognize, however, that such immersion is a function 
of analytic decisions concerning the problem space (see 
Randall et al 2007). 
We raise these issues only to foreground the many and 
varied practices that constitute the ethnographic project. 
Our interest here does not lie in the tying of specific and 
local practices to more general cultural issues, but in a 
workable analysis of a specific series of events. We are 
not, put simply, doing anthropology. Our problem space 
is narrower. Our researchers include Arab-speakers with a 
better than working knowledge of background cultural 
issues. The very difficult circumstances of our 
investigations (which could be, in certain circumstances, 
dangerous- see Tawil-Souri 2009) meant that talking to 
people and observing their behavior had to be done in a 
cautious and occasioned manner.  
These risks are even more pronounced (of course) for 
local actors and so building trust is a crucial issue. In May 
2010 the first author visited the West Bank to explore 
opportunities for research and academic co-operation, 
specifically seeking to understand whether the concept of 
come_IN computer club houses which aimed to overcome 
ethnic and digital divides in Germany (cf. Stevens et al. 
2005) could be transferred to the context of the West 
Bank. Following the “Arab Spring” uprisings, our 
research focus broadened to also include the use of social 
media by political activists (Wulf et al. 2013). After a 
personal introduction by an advisor of the Palestinian 
President, two researchers visited Al Ma’sara for half a 
day. They were received by Hasan, the head of the 
solidarity committee, and parts of his extended family in 
their house. After a presentation on the local geo-political 
environment, they were introduced to the village’s 
demonstration activities. Lengthy discussions of political 
and personal matters took place. In April 2011 researchers 
spent two days in the village. They walked around the 
village and conducted a variety of unstructured interviews 
with different activists living in the village, mainly 
members of Hasan’s family and other political activists. 
In the evening of the first days they held a two-hour 
workshop on how the village could benefit from 
computers, the internet, as well as a come_IN club house 
and its network. Seven local activists participated in this 
workshop. On the second day the weekly demonstration 
took place and was observed by the researchers. Informal 
interviews with some of the participants from the village, 
as well as from Israel and different European countries 
were conducted. Interestingly, at this point, Hasan 
 introduced his Facebook account to the researchers for the 
first time. 
In May 2012 two authors visited the village one more 
time and stayed there overnight. Again, they conducted 
informal interviews with different political activists and 
visited the newly established computer club house. In 
September 2012 four authors spent another two days in 
the village interviewing and audio taping talks with 
different local and international activists. They also 
observed the weekly demonstrations and the usage of 
(social) media after the manifestations. Additionally, they 
conducted a workshop with children who had attended the 
computer club house sessions. 
Some eight days were spent in the village. We 
interviewed 5 local activists, most of them more than 
once, up to twelve times, 3 inhabitants of Al Masara, 3 
international activists, as well as two Israeli activists. The 
interviews lasted between ten minutes and more than 
three hours. In between the visits, the Palestinian authors 
stayed in regular contact with the activists via telephone 
and thus kept track with the developments in their lives. 
Due to the delicate political context we did not audiotape 
most of the interviews or phone calls, nor the workshop. 
However, we documented interviews, observations, and 
the workshop via photos and field notes. In the evenings 
of the respective days we wrote down detailed notes, all 
in all around 80 pages.  
To achieve our objectives we also analyzed materials 
created by the political activists dealing with the village’s 
struggle. Our initial analysis focused on videos accessible 
via YouTube and emails distributed to supporters via 
mailing lists. One of the authors had been a member of 
one of the mailing lists since his first visit to Al Ma’sara 
in 2010. He thus received about 80 emails, mainly 
reporting on the weekly demonstrations in the village. As 
the activists’ Facebook activities increased, we analyzed - 
with their consent - their respective accounts. During his 
first visit in April 2012 one author was added as a ‘friend’ 
to the activists’ Facebook accounts and thus was able to 
continuously follow their postings. Over the period of 
three months the authors observed the Facebook pin 
boards of Hasan (reaching back to summer 2010), the 
village’s mayor Mahmoud (reaching back to summer 
2010), and Hasan’s brother Mohamad (reaching back to 
the beginning of 2012). We saved all their postings and 
selectively translated textual elements from Arabic to 
German (about 30 pages). 
Due to the political nature of our study we had to make 
special efforts when triangulating narratives. The sources 
of our empirical investigation, as we acknowledge, are 
restricted to the Palestinian side of the conflict. To 
triangulate our data we followed five strategies: (1) we 
talked to the political activists about the same topics at 
different times and levels of detail, (2) we talked to 
different actors about similar topics, (3) we matched 
internet-based materials with interviews and observational 
data, (4) we discussed our findings within the team of 
authors, partly composed of Palestinians, (5) and we 
followed the mass media coverage of the village’s 
political struggle in Palestinian, Israeli, as well in 
international media. All names of the activists and their 
village are real ones. The authors suggested anonymising 
the data, but the interviewees rejected this proposal and 
asked the authors to use their real names. 
AL MA’SARA: A FAMILY HISTORY 
To analyze the village’s political activities requires some 
historical background. Hasan’s family clan is the biggest 
land owner in the village. With 450 members they own 
almost 52% of the village lands, while another family clan 
with some 400 members owns the rest. Mahmoud, the 
young mayor, belongs to the second clan. Hasan and his 
closer family are considered to be the most outspoken 
protagonists of the village’s political struggle. To 
understand why, we give a brief account of the family’s 
history in recent decades.  
After Israel had occupied the West Bank in 1967, Hasan’s 
parents left for Kuwait to work there. Hasan was brought 
up in the Gulf area and later on studied physics in India. 
While living in Kuwait, the family visited their West 
Bank village once a year for the summer holidays. The 
family returned to the West Bank after the first Gulf war, 
but there were few opportunities for a graduate in physics 
to work in his professional field. So he worked for a 
supermarket in a nearby Israeli settlement. At the 
beginning of the Second Intifada, Hasan felt that it was 
not possible for him to continue working in this position. 
So he decided to work on the family’s farm, built two 
green houses, introduced ecological farming methods, and 
sold the products directly to customers in nearby 
Bethlehem.  
During the Second Intifada, Hasan became a local 
coordinator of the Fatah movement’s activities in the 
South Bethlehem region. One of his younger brothers, 
Ali, became a member of Fatah’s armed forces.   
In 2003, demonstrations against the separation wall 
started in the north of the West Bank in villages such as 
Budrus, Bil’in and Ni’lin. In 2006 one of the younger 
brothers of Hasan, Mohamad organized the first 
demonstration in Al Ma’sara. Activists from the northern 
West Bank villages supported him by informing 
international and Israeli activists who then came to 
participate in the village’s struggle. Hasan decided to join 
him in organizing the weekly demonstrations after his 
brother had been beaten up by Israeli soldiers. He was 
arrested six times by the Israeli army, the last time in 
December 2011 for 30 days. ’I am getting quite used to 
their procedures of detainment and interrogation’, Hasan 
says. Each time he was arrested he would be released 
after a few weeks. Over the years he spent more than one 
year in Israeli prisons. The family’s house was searched 
by the Israeli army several times, especially at night. Ali, 
the younger brother who had joined the military fringe of 
Fatah, was arrested during such a house search and is 
serving a 15-year-sentence in an Israeli jail on charges of 
terrorist activities. The opportunities to visit him in prison 
are very limited. Hasan told us in 2010: ‘During the last 
five years [since his arrest], I was able to see him only 
once very briefly when I was imprisoned in the same 
Israeli jail. His youngest son was born after he was 
arrested. He calls his father ‘Uncle Ali’ like all his 
cousins in the village do.’ 
Al Ma’sara has also benefited. The Palestinian Authority 
seems to specifically support villages which protest 
against the occupation policy by ranking them highly for 
donors’ investments in infrastructure. During the last 
years, international development agencies such as US Aid 
or Germany’s KfW have supported the building of two 
schools, a kindergarten, and a health station.  
AL MA’SARA: ORGANIZING DEMONSTRATIONS 
In pursuit of their objectives, the weekly demonstrations 
are the most important vehicle for activity. IT and digital 
media play a major role in preparing and documenting 
these events. First, we want to describe how these 
demonstrations are being organized. 
The demonstrations start every Friday in the early 
afternoon with a march from the center of the village 
towards a road connecting Israeli settlements. Before the 
demonstration reaches the road, the Israeli army typically 
stops the demonstration with a chain of jeeps where 
soldiers armed with machine pistols block the 
demonstrators’ march. As Hasan puts it ’They try to 
prevent us from reaching the road.’ At that point the 
demonstrators shout their messages, deliver speeches, and 
give interviews. However, often protesters try to access 
their land by attempting to breach the blockade. The 
Israeli forces hinder them from doing so; at that point 
violence can erupt. Videos of the village’s weekly 
demonstrations can be found on YouTube. Until 2011, the 
videos were typically edited by foreign participants. 
Activists also routinely take a lot of photos which are 
posted on Facebook pin boards and in different Facebook 
groups. Photographs are also taken by Israeli soldiers with 
mobile phones and cameras. 
Demonstrations are typically larger when they are aligned 
with an international event such as the International 
Women’s or Children’s day or when they refer to specific 
Palestinian events, such as the Nakba Day –
commemorating the expulsion of the Palestinian 
population in 1948. For these occasions, activists 
mobilize more intensely. Mahmoud mentioned ‘Last week 
we had 200 people here to recall the Day of the Prisoners 
[arrested in Israeli jails].’Demonstrations in the different 
villages struggling against the wall are coordinated. 
Members of the villages’ organizational committees meet 
once every week to agree upon a motto for the next 
weekend’s demonstration. Demonstrations take place in 
sequential order. After a demonstration in one village, the 
activists typically join one in another village on the south 
of the West Bank. 
Hasan told us that demonstrations are most effective if 
Palestinians, Israelis and foreigners, mostly Europeans 
and occasionally US citizens, participate jointly. Thus the 
biggest effect can be reached with regard to political 
impact and media coverage. However, levels of 
engagement did vary significantly. During one 
demonstration the fourth author conducted informal talks 
in Arabic with two men from the village aged about 40 
who stood aside to watch the scene. They told her why 
they did not participate in the weekly demonstrations: 
Firstly, they thought "it's all useless", and secondly they 
were afraid of losing their work permits in Israel. On the 
other side, a young female Israeli activist stated in an 
audio taped interview in Hasan’s family home just before 
this September demonstration started that her motivation 
to regularly join the Al Ma’sara demonstrations was to 
raise the awareness in Israel, especially among 
youngsters, concerning the situation in the territories 
occupied by Israel. While the Palestinians and some 
Israeli participants are quite used to the tactics of the 
Israeli army, foreign visitors, Hasan says, typically 
disappear as soon as the soldiers start using physical 
violence or tear gas. 
Organizing a demonstration against the Israeli wall 
requires a balance between insisting on marching towards 
the settlements on the one hand and avoiding violence on 
the Palestinian side on the other. Controlling 
demonstrations is a challenge, and stone throwing by 
young participants is not uncommon. In other words, 
there is a twofold purpose. The first one is an explicit 
challenge to Israeli authority and the second one an 
attempt to engage media support. The former objective 
tends to create more confrontational situations.  Protesters 
sometimes try to circumvent the blockage of the soldiers 
and army jeeps. Sometimes they provoke the Israeli 
soldiers by climbing the engine hood of their jeeps and 
speak from there. Depending on the commands of Israeli 
officers controlling the site, soldiers then arrest activists 
and dissolve the demonstration. Hasan has been wounded 
twice and hospitalized as a result of tear gas grenades 
fired on him.  
AL MA’SARA: A WEEKLY DEMONSTRATION  
In the following we want to describe the demonstration 
we observed in April 2011. Some 45 min before the 
demonstration was supposed to start some foreign 
activists and their local guides were received in the 
traditional living room of Hasan’s family home. After 
 some small talk and a tea served to them, four of the 
village’s activists start to explain the geographical 
conditions on a local map. The presentation is held in 
English and is similar to that experienced by the 
researchers on their first visit. The activists point to the 
location of the different Israeli settlements and that of the 
separation wall. They also explain how the Israeli 
occupation is affecting their daily lives and mention the 
fact that a family member is held in prison while another 
brother has been killed by Israeli forces. They also point 
out how settlers are preventing them from using their land 
and destroying the villages’ olive trees. The presentations 
are very much grounded in the activists’ personal 
experiences. An old lady, the mother of one of the 
activists, later comes in and addresses the foreign visitors 
in Arabic, translated by the activists into English.  
After taking some group photos in the living room which 
were later on posted to Hasan’s Facebook page, a group 
of some 10-15 Palestinians and Europeans leave the house 
and start walking towards the expropriated land. On the 
way through the village they are joined by other villagers. 
Half way, a group of some 10 Israeli activists from Tel 
Aviv join the march. Some of these activists have been 
coming regularly for years to support the villagers in their 
demonstrations; others represent a new students’ 
movement on the Israeli left. They tell us that also some 
of them were arrested by the Israeli army, but usually are 
released quite soon. 
When arrested, Israeli authorities try to push the Israeli 
activists to sign a written agreement that they will not 
participate in any demonstration in the West Bank for 
some period of time. One of the Norwegian students 
reported that a similar request was made towards him 
when entering Israel.  
Finally the march of some 30 Palestinian, Israeli and 
European activists reaches a major road leading to the 
settlement. Two army jeeps with some 12 soldiers stop 
the march at the end of that road. The soldiers create a 
barrier. Soon after, a third jeep with a higher officer 
arrives on the site. This jeep also carries an army 
photographer with a camera equipped with a strong 
telephoto lens.  
The protesters stay in front of the army barrier, shouting 
political slogans, Hasan and one other activist give brief 
speeches before handing over to an experienced Israeli 
activist. The Israeli specifically addresses the soldiers 
using the Hebrew language. A Palestinian journalist and a 
TV team arrive on the site and interview Hasan who 
articulates the political message of the protesters. No acts 
of violence by the Israeli army are witnessed, and 
protesters stay in front of the barrier. After about an hour 
the demonstration starts to dissolve. 
ROLE OF INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE 
VILLAGE’S STRUGGLE  
The weekly demonstrations, as we have suggested, are the 
most important element of the village’s political 
resistance. Al Ma’sara is a rural village with an only very 
slowly developing telecommunication infrastructure. 
However, over the course of the last two years we were 
able to observe a remarkable development in the use of 
the internet in support of its political activities. 
When we visited in 2010, there was no internet 
connectivity in the village, as in many other rural areas of 
the West Bank. Even then, however, activists were aware 
of the importance of the new media. As Mahmoud 
pointed out: “With using media we could reach a wider 
public and would gain international awareness for our 
problems. However, we have to become more 
professional in this field.” They pressed the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) to provide internet access. This may have 
been one of the reasons why a senior PA official had 
asked us to investigate opportunities to build a Computer 
Club in the village. At a visit to his ministry in 2010, the 
minister of telecommunication had suggested that rural 
Palestine would receive complete internet coverage within 
the next two years. 
When we came back to the village in 2011, the 
Palestinian telecommunication operators had not yet 
provided internet access. Israeli regulations still did not 
allow any Palestinian mobile provider to offer 3G data 
services (see section 3). However, the village had 
organized internet provision via the 3G network of an 
Israeli mobile telephone provider. From a central 3G 
antenna and router on the village’s hill top, they used Wi-
Fi to distribute Internet access to four family houses and a 
community space in the village’s health center where a 
laptop was available. The costs for the hardware 
equipment and the monthly fees to be paid to the Israeli 
provider were high by European standards and network 
speed was low. Other family houses in the village and all 
of the other eight neighboring Palestinian villages were 
not yet connected to the internet. Finally, in May 2012, 
just two weeks before our visit, the Palestinian landline 
provider brought internet access via a specifically drawn 
cable to the village and the computer room in its health 
center. 
Even before the Internet was made accessible in the 
village, Hasan had already started to use Email and 
Facebook for his political activities through an Internet 
connection in his office. He used Email mainly to inform 
his wide network of supporters and journalists about the 
political conditions and activities in the villages, and 
invite supporters to upcoming demonstrations.  
On the laptop in the community space he also showed us 
a large collection of photos and videos representing 
different demonstrations and protest marches that had 
taken place in recent years. These materials were locally 
stored and not yet published on the Internet. Other photos 
and videos documenting their protests were still stored on 
his smart phone. While presenting these materials to us, 
he specifically pointed to critical incidents – such as 
villagers being beaten and arrested, him being 
hospitalized as a result of a tear gas grenade shot on him, 
or an Easter march which made it past an astonished 
Israeli army post and moved through a gate to the other 
side of the separation wall. While a year ago none of these 
digital materials were presented to us, the availability of a 
laptop screen seemed to have offered additional 
opportunities to ground and structure his narratives.  
Hasan began to use Facebook in 2010 - the first in the 
villages. At the time of our visit in 2011, he presented his 
Facebook account to us for the first time. We could see 
different groups of mainly Israeli supporters. He showed 
us photos of them on their homepages in Facebook, some 
of them showing them participating in the demonstrations. 
Later that day we met one of the Israeli supporters who 
had participated in the demonstration. While browsing his 
Facebook account with us, Hasan occasionally sent 
messages to some of his Israeli supporters, reminding 
them to take part in the afternoon’s demonstration.  
Since our visit in 2011, activists have engaged with their 
Facebook accounts much more intensively. They post 
photos and texts on the village’s demonstrations as well 
as private photos. The posted photos portray the different 
groups participating in the demonstrations, i.e. Palestinian 
activists, international supporters, Israeli activists, and 
soldiers. The photos tend to show conflict situations, with 
soldiers’ weapons on display. In contrast, villagers are 
portrayed in a peaceful manner, often accompanied by 
their children. 
 They have progressively become more skillful in making 
sense of the functionalities Facebook offers such as 
making use of Facebook groups, sharing pictures of other 
activists and writing notes. Being invited to their 
Facebook accounts, we were able to see that Mahmoud 
had 271 friends, and Hasan 542, while Mohamed had the 
largest number of friends adding up to a total of 791. In 
our understanding these friends are mainly other local 
activists from Palestine, although they also include 
‚normal‘ acquaintances and family members. In the 
meantime, by 2012 there were already more persons in 
the Facebook group than on the mailing list. 
In mid-August, 2012, we suddenly found the ‘friend’ 
function adjusted in a way that we could no longer see 
what kind of friends and how many of them the activists 
have. The reason for this change in configuration 
remained unclear to us. After a demonstration on July 6, 
2012, Hasan uploaded several photos to his Facebook 
account. The demonstration was organized to remind the 
public of the ruling of the International Court of Justice in 
Den Haag which had stated on July 9, 2004 that the 
construction of the wall violates international law. About 
one hour after the end of the above mentioned 
demonstration on July 6 Mahmoud posted a photo taken 
in the course of the demonstration and added a text 
written in Arabic with some general information on the 
local fight against the wall. This message is addressed to 
all activists and claims that the role of the international 
supporters should be ‘to support the founding of a 
Palestinian State at the UN and to say that the Palestinian 
people is in the right.’  
When looking at the Facebook postings of the activists 
from Al Ma’sara, it is striking that their personal pages 
are an assemblage of materials dealing with a variety of 
issues such as politics, private life, music, film, and 
religion. Mohamad posts only in Arabic, whereas 
Mahmoud and Hasan post in Arabic as well as in English. 
Mohamad seems to be the official spokesperson for the 
Arabic speaking community, while Mahmoud with his 
rather good command of English is in charge of the 
announcements in English. The postings in Arabic are 
generally more elaborated and longer than the ones in 
English. This is probably due to the relatively limited 
command of written English compared to the activists’ 
command of Arabic, their mother tongue.  
The Facebook postings in Arabic are typically descriptive 
and factual, although the language used cannot be said to 
be neutral. They are locally targeted, and sometimes 
contain a direct call to the target group to actively take 
part or show solidarity with the Palestinians’ striving for 
their rights, whereas English language posts tend to have 
a more ‘ideological’ flavor. An example for this 
difference in the use of the two languages is the 
announcement of the death of a Palestinian activist who 
had died a natural death. The English version contains the 
phrase ‘today palestine so sad today all the world must be 
sad’ and appeals to a broader public. The goal of this text 
- and other texts written in English is to call upon the 
activists to feel compassion for the Palestinian cause. The 
character of the Arabic version is more descriptive, 
providing information about the death of this well-known 
figure, characterized as a ‘hero’ and ‘martyr’. Also, the 
Arabic version does not contain a call upon the world to 
mourn with the Palestinian people. 
Apart from their Facebook postings the activists are also 
members of different Facebook groups, such as “palestine 
al-masara” and “Al-masra press”. In the description of the 
Facebook group “Al-masra press” they indicate (in 
Arabic) that “the news agency was founded by people’s 
media activists to report about the activities and the 
events dealing with people’s resistance in the village”. 
The goal of the news agency is to report “in a veracious 
and outspoken manner” via photos, videos and 
journalistic accounts of violations of rights as a result of 
 the occupation. This Facebook group, astonishingly, was 
created and is maintained by a thirteen-year-old boy who 
is also attending demonstrations in the village. The 
postings show photos and descriptions of the weekly 
demonstrations including preparations as well as photos 
and reports on community activities. They also include 
newspaper reports from the Internet, for example the ones 
published by MaanNews (www.maannews.net). This 
Facebook group can be seen by anyone who clicks on the 
“like” option. The other group, “palestine al-masara”, is a 
closed Facebook group which can only be accessed after 
having being invited by a member or the group 
administrator. The short description of the group 
translates as, “weekly demonstration in al masara village 
South Bethlehem”. The group was founded by Mahmoud 
in May 2012 and already consisted of 137 members only 
three months later. Interestingly, two months after their 
visit, two of the authors were added to the group without 
being asked. The postings include calls to participate in 
the weekly demonstrations. The group members also post 
photos taken during these demonstrations and other 
commented pictures supporting the Palestinians’ struggle. 
Additionally, this Facebook group contains some general 
information on Al-Ma’sara village published by 
Palestinian media sources and postings from “Al-masra 
press”. In order to reach the international public 
Mahmoud’s brother additionally launched a French 
version of this Facebook group. 
There is a certain division of labor among the activists. 
While Mohamad and Hasan only post on their private 
Facebook pin boards, Mahmoud is in charge of the 
mailing lists and the Facebook groups. After a 
demonstration Mohamad would typically call the radio 
stations and send press releases in Arabic language to the 
news agencies to inform them of what happened during 
the demonstration. Later on, Mahmoud translates these 
press releases into English and distributes them via the 
mailing list. Occasionally, he also posts them in the 
Facebook group.  
The photos taken during the demonstrations are typically 
posted on the local activists’ Facebook accounts and in 
their Facebook groups without seeking permission from 
participants. We observed one case in which a European 
participant felt uneasy about having his photo being 
published by the local activists and asked for its removal 
from the Facebook site, which was done. 
In the following, we want to provide an example of the 
activists’ use of mailing lists. On a Friday afternoon in 
April 2011, directly after the demonstration, we received 
an email containing a press release in the body of the 
email message, describing what had happened on the 
scene. The press release was sent in three languages, in 
Arabic, English, and French. Before the demonstration 
started, still in the living room of Hasan’s house, 
Mahmoud had asked all European participants to give him 
their email addresses. The English version of the text 
reads as follows: 
"Today launched a demonstration in the village of al-
Ma'sara in memory of Palestinian Prisoners Day. Where 
he participated in the demonstration more than 70 
demonstrators, including foreign solidarity from 
European countries and the solidarity of Israelis. Out 
where demonstrators carrying Palestinian flags for 
access to their land which lies to the inside of the wall of 
annexation and expansion." 
All 117 email addresses were revealed in the recipient’s 
field. In the evening after the demonstration Hasan 
additionally sent greetings to the same list of recipients 
attaching photos he had taken in his living room just 
before the demonstration started. Given the fact that 
participating in the demonstrations can have inconvenient 
consequences at the Israeli border, some of the Europeans 
felt unnecessarily exposed. However, Mahmoud told us 
that there are always some recipients who respond to his 
mails stating that they liked to take part in the 
demonstrations.  
To better connect to the national and international public, 
the village’s activists recently launched a WordPress blog 
conveying photos and announcements about their 
activities and campaigns. The site was launched and is 
supported by international activists from the UK who pay 
the provider fees for the .com address. Later on, 
Mahmoud took over the maintenance of this site. At the 
time of writing, the site is under construction. When we 
visited the site there were only higher level categories to 
be found, such as prisoners, summer camp, woman’s 
center, and computer club. The site as yet contains no 
substantive content. 
DISCUSSION 
Our study describes, in a necessarily impressionistic way, 
the political practices of Palestinian activists in a village 
which struggles against the Israeli occupation and the 
separation wall. We focus on the way in which 
demonstrations are organized and the new media 
progressively got adopted in support of their agendas. 
While the availability of the internet reflects the 
continuing reality of a ‘digital divide’ and improves only 
slowly in rural Palestine, local activists have appropriated 
Email and Facebook to organize weekly demonstrations 
and maintain a social network of supporters. Our 
empirical data describes a growing role social media play 
in: (1) stimulating the participation in the weekly 
demonstrations under the conditions of military 
occupation, (2) interacting regularly with a network of 
Israeli supporters, (3) keeping a much looser network of 
international activists informed about the demonstrations, 
(4) offering information to the broader public. We 
observe a number of features associated with this. Firstly, 
there is an intersection between the real and the virtual 
which operates in a variety of ways. Facebook and email 
posts serve a primarily ideological function when 
addressed to wider communities, but are much more 
likely to implicate direct calls for action when addressed 
to the Arab-speaking and Israeli support communities. 
While this is scarcely surprising, it does demonstrate a 
difference from other accounts of Internet mobilization 
such as those offered by Starbird and Palen (2012).  
Secondly, and allied to this, the structure of Facebook 
pages indicates that there is a very particular sense here in 
which ‘the personal is the political’. Local activists make 
few if any attempts to distinguish their personal and 
family lives from their political work. Their personal lives 
are deeply interwoven with their jobs in the PA 
administration and their political engagement. 
Interestingly, the appropriation of Facebook as a political 
platform allows them to link private life to political 
activities in a new manner. The personal, as it were, is 
newly political. Further, and as we initially pointed out, 
we should not discount the importance of the face-to-face 
nature of many political activities. Obviously a 
demonstration requires the physical presence of the 
political activists. The routines involved in preparing for 
the demonstration in Hasan’s living room build personal 
relationships as much as they prepare for the activities 
which follow.  
Thirdly, the personal is the political here in another sense, 
to whit that online activity may have very real- but varied- 
consequences for participants. There is growing 
awareness of the possibility of monitoring and the 
consequent privacy issues. We observed that the social 
media practices of activists were sometimes perceived as 
problematic by their (arguably more sophisticated) 
supporters. Specifically the posting of photos on 
Facebook pages and the usage of open mailing lists were 
perceived as problematic by some of the participants in 
the demonstration. This perception can be contributed to 
different levels of engagement ‘on the ground’. Village 
activists are well known to the Israeli security apparatus 
and their political struggle for their land is a dominant 
part of their life. These experiences are utterly routine for 
them. By contrast, international participants display 
greater anxiety and are highly conscious of the 
consequences there might be for them, for instance, at 
border crossing points. An important feature of this is that 
online functionalities are not simply adopted but have to 
be learned, and so do the different implications for local 
activists and their supporters in the wider community.  
This implicates our final point, which is that the digital 
divide remains a reality for many people. Accounts of the 
use of the new media arguably underplay situations where 
there are real and ongoing constraints on the possibility of 
their deployment. These constraints are themselves 
material and political. Internet access is a challenge for 
political activists in rural areas of the West Bank. One 
needs to keep in mind that Al Ma’sara is just 10 km south 
of Bethlehem. The availability of the internet is restricted 
by a weak landline infrastructure and the Israeli refusal to 
grant 3 G licenses to Palestinian mobile internet 
providers. These conditions impact the developmental 
opportunities in rural Palestine. A feature of this is that 
access is available only to a relatively small number of 
people on a preferential basis (both from the PNA and 
external sources).  
CONCLUSION 
Political activism and protest activities are determined by 
political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986). When 
political activities are technologically supported, we 
might speak of technological opportunity structures, too 
(cf. Saeed et al., 2011). In the case of the West Bank these 
opportunity structures are mainly defined by the Israeli 
government, the PA, and Palestinian and Israeli 
telecommunication providers, in a complex interplay with 
the biographies, histories and ideological commitments of 
participants. The Israeli policy of not licensing Palestinian 
3G providers requires the PA to invest much more money 
in providing internet via landlines and, for the time being, 
makes rural Palestine dependent on Israeli 3G providers. 
For the activists this option is a risky one due to a lack of 
any control with regard to internet availability and 
security.  
Beyond mere access to the internet, the availability of 
social media combined with IT skills and creativity in 
appropriating those applications plays a major role in 
determining the effect on political actors’ practices. Our 
point in relation to these opportunity structures is that 
social, political and technological structures are closely 
interwoven. Both ideology and material circumstance 
influences practice. These aspects of the opportunity 
structure are typically emerging bottom-up and are 
significantly much harder to control for authorities such 
as the Israeli government or the PA. In the case of Al 
Ma’sara, the appropriation process of IT seems to have 
been spurred by Israeli and European supporters who 
have started to document the demonstrations and posted 
these videos on internet platforms such as Youtube. While 
the local activists were initially not in control of the 
videos’ final cut and the political messages they 
conveyed, they quickly recognized opportunities to make 
sense of social media applications in their political 
struggle. So the questionable legitimacy of the Israeli wall 
and its settlement policy not only brings external actors to 
the village on a weekly basis, it also opened opportunities 
to spur the appropriation of social media applications in 
support of political activities. 
In order to understand how the appropriation of social 
media is embedded in activists’ practices, we conducted 
 an ‘on the ground’ study which offers a rather unique 
access to their (political) lives and the framing conditions 
of the occupation. This has necessitated an approach to 
ethnographic work which is more ‘fractured’. Obviously, 
we could only observe what the activists allowed us to see 
and our own engagement was intermittent. It follows that 
a careful interpretation and analysis of observation and 
interview data is crucial. We tackled this potential 
problem by a systematic “triangulation” of our findings, 
comparing data from different sources, re-sampling data 
on the same events and activities, and cross-checking 
information from interviews. Even so, we acknowledge 
some limitations. Work in the context we describe is 
delicate, difficult and sometimes fraught. If, however, we 
are to develop approaches which enable us to understand 
online behavior and its relation to ‘on the ground’ 
behavior, it is necessary.   
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